Thoughts on Iran have to begin with the awe we feel, again, for the U.S. military. Its professionalism, cool and courage are impressive and inspiring. And we must give Donald Trump his due: His decision was bold, he took a big swing.

The end of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and scores of his colleagues-in-hellish-rule isn’t bad news for the world but good, as is what looks to be inevitable damage to or even possible ending of its nuclear program.
You’ve got to hope it’s all going to succeed, that it will make America’s position an inch or two better in the world and not an inch or two worse, that a violent regime will be replaced by something better, safer.
But it’s a gamble, a huge one, and we’ll find out if it was a reckless one.
Of course it is a war. We are bombing a sovereign nation and have killed its leaders; we’ve sunk much of the Iranian fleet. This isn’t a situation that lends itself to phrases like “limited series of strikes.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has said it could go three weeks, maybe eight. You don’t know when you launch something like this how and when it ends.
(Quickly, on Mr. Hegseth. Someone has to calm him down. He’s supposed to be trying to get the world to see the wisdom of the administration’s actions. Instead he’s something between an excitable morning TV anchor and the rooster who thought he brought the dawn. “We’re playing for keeps.” “We’re punching them while they’re down.” He brags about our “lethality.” Stop talking like that! Don’t feed the stereotypes, don’t tempt the gods.)
Should Congress debate the war seriously and at length? Yes, of course. That’s its job. We are a republic. Stick with it, with its forms, delineations and responsibilities. “Half of Congress is useless.” Half of Congress is always useless, but it’s what we’ve got.
The argument for the war is serious: For almost half a century, Iran’s government has been causing violent trouble in the world. It has been increasing its production of weaponry, it has long vowed death to America and Israel, and, after the June bombing of its nuclear installations and the crushing of December and January’s street protests, it is seriously weakened. So move.
Mr. Trump first won the presidency with fiery denunciations of illegal immigration and forever wars. He doesn’t like war but he looks to have grown to like sparks, and he’s had a lot of recent good fortune with the use of force. When he first bombed Iran, that country did little in response; when he moved on Venezuela, plucking its ruler from his bed, there was no blowback. It’s possible this has left him thinking the world’s bad guys are a Potemkin village, that they talk big but fold quickly. But is that true?
He is gambling when he thinks he’s on a winning streak. Iran’s government ducked and covered through the June bombings, but now they will be fighting to keep from losing everything. It’s hard to imagine the regime’s death throes, if it comes to that, will be pretty.
It isn’t fear-mongering to think about potentially harrowing repercussions to the U.S. actions, which could include a widening war in the Mideast, a broadening and escalation of hostilities, the dragging in of U.S. allies, a drain on our armaments becoming a provocation to potential adversaries, a terrorist strike or strikes from Iranian operatives or nonstate actors, oil spikes, an energy shock—20% of the world’s oil goes through the Strait of Hormuz. Many in the military services, and possibly civilians, may be casualties.
Here is what I infer of the president’s logic. The bombing has a good chance of slowing or stopping Iran’s nuclear, ballistic-missile and drone programs. It will certainly degrade and damage Iran’s infrastructure, standing, mystique. The country will be diminished. If its leaders are killed, so be it. If those who replace them are better, good. If they are just as bad or worse, at least they will be operating in reduced circumstances. They’ll be forced to turn to rebuilding their country. They might therefore be diverted from arms-making, at least for a while. And if, down the road, they act up in harmful ways, they will know in the back of their minds that the U.S. may move on them again. This may moderate their actions and decisions.
I infer because Mr. Trump has given many reasons for his decisions. This is not reassuring. He’s offered varying explanations for going forward—he had a feeling, or Israel was going to move anyway—and in the end whatever happens is what he’ll say he wanted. If there’s regime change, that was his intention all along. If there isn’t, it wasn’t what he was looking for.
The hope for an armed uprising by the Iranian people strikes me as absurd. They don’t have arms. They live in a police state. The ayatollahs have operated with Mao’s understanding that power comes out of the barrel of a gun. The Journal reports that Israel targeted not only Iranian missile and drone sites but the nation’s police-state apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps headquarters in Tehran, in hope of clearing the way for a popular revolt.
Could that happen? People who have lived under a dictatorship for almost half a century are forced to survive and rise within a sick system. Those most likely to oppose the religio-fascist state that oppressed them would likely lack the street fervor of street Islamists. When your country is being bombed and your cousin’s neighborhood hit, the impulse is to defend your land and shake your fist at the bombers.
U.S. polls so far aren’t supportive of the president’s decision. What might be behind the reservations? The administration’s communication of its thinking could, it’s true, be substantially improved. Formal, detailed explanations of official thinking are needed in situations like this, but they aren’t magic. George W. Bush’s addresses on the decision to go into Iraq were regular and substantive, but they couldn’t make that war succeed.
No one outside Iran likes its regime. Most Americans would believe it is a danger to us, that it wishes us ill, that it has thrived on terror and oppression. The government of the mullahs has no serious constituency here. But after Afghanistan and Iraq, people think America is snakebit in the Mideast, that nothing dramatic will likely work. Small, incremental moves might help, in the diplomatic day to day. But moving militarily on a Mideast country? No, we’re snakebit.
If I were in Congress, would I vote right now to support the administration’s action in Iran? I think not, due to the severity of some of the possible repercussions outlined above.
It is possible that thinking is unimaginative, too dead to the urgency of the moment. The fact is you only know on something like this in retrospect. Right now we’re waiting for the “in retrospect” to occur. That is an uncomfortable place to be in.



Gathering anxieties seemed to come to the fore this week. AI people told us with a new urgency that some big leap has occurred, it’s all moving faster than expected, the AI of even last summer has been far surpassed. Inventors and creators are admitting in new language that they aren’t at all certain of the ultimate impact.
The Post was a pillar. The sweeping layoffs and narrowing of coverage announced this week followed years of buyouts and shrinking sections. None of this feels like the restructuring of a paper or a rearranging of priorities, but like the doing-in of a paper, a great one, a thing of journalistic grandeur from some point in the 1960s through some point in the 2020s. I feel it damaged itself when, under the pressure of the pandemic, George Floyd and huge technological and journalistic changes, it wobbled—and not in the opinion section but on the news side. But I kept my subscription because that is a way of trusting, of giving a great paper time to steady itself. (And there would always be an important David Ignatius column, or a great scoop on some governmental scandal that made it worth the cost.)

I queried acquaintances of mixed political disposition: What have you seen of Donald Trump the past year that is different from his first administration?
Gallantry never says it won.